The Sixth Book


Chapter XVIII

Seventeenth Year of the War – The Sicilian Campaign – Affair of the

Hermae – Departure of the Expedition

 

The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with

a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible,

to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its size and

of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the

fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against

the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman is

not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there

are only two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland.

 

It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied

it are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the

country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what

race they were, or whence they came or whither they went, and must

leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may

be generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to have been

the next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of

all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven

by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them

that the island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania,

and to the present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall

of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships

to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians under the general name

of Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled

some of the Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a storm, first

to Libya, and afterwards from thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed

over to Sicily from their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans,

as tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched

till the wind set down the strait to effect the passage; although

perhaps they may have sailed over in some other way. Even at the present

day there are still Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name

of Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called. These went

with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle and

forced them to remove to the south and west of the island, which thus

came to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and after they crossed

over continued to enjoy the richest parts of the country for near

three hundred years before any Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they

still hold the centre and north of the island. There were also Phoenicians

living all round Sicily, who had occupied promontories upon the sea

coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose of trading with the

Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers

by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and drawing

together took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near

the Elymi, partly because they confided in their alliance, and also

because these are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage

and Sicily.

 

These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the

Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with Thucles,

their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes,

which now stands outside the town, and upon which the deputies for

the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily. Syracuse was founded

the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from Corinth,

who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which the

inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water:

in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls

and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out

from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and

drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana;

the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder.

 

About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara,

and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas,

and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians

at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his

death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place

called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up

the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and

forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and

the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion,

however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out

Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country

Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus

from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony

thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse.

The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel

now stands, and which was first fortified, being called Lindii. The

institutions which they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred and

eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas

(Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name, and made Aristonous

and Pystilus their founders; giving their own institutions to the

colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian

town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers

came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the

place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis

respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels,

because the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon;

but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians

and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and

the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant

of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized with a mixed population,

and its name changed to Messina, after his old country.

 

Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most

of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were

joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called

the Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric,

but the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and

Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after

Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded

by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after

the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus.

But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for

having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving

their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina,

himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by

Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by the Geloans.

 

Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting

Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were

now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering

the whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring

their kindred and other allies in the island. But they were especially

incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked

their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war

with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage

and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance

of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans

now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches,

during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to

their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital

argument that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for

their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens

in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their hands,

there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force,

as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists,

to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining

these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore,

do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to make a

stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans,

were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war. The Athenians,

hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by

the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to

Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked of in

the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what

posture was the war with the Selinuntines.

 

The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily.

The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians

excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part

of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn.

They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few

soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce

for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives

were to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the army.

Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred

heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces,

marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison

escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The

next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground,

and went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their

ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian

border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were

at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon this the Lacedaemonians

sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens from

one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in the war,

which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it ended

the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

 

Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived

from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents

of uncoined silver, as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were

to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after

hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive

as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular

as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the

temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under

the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus,

and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers;

they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore

Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other

matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens.

Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest

means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required

by the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen

to the command against his will, and who thought that the state was

not well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring

to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve,

came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise,

and gave them the following counsel:

 

«Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations

to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we

have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send

out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration

to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners

into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet,

individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little

as other men for my person- not that I think a man need be any the

worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on

the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity

of his country more than others- nevertheless, as I have never spoken

against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so

now, but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words

of mine would be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what

you have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages

which are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain.

I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is

out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.

 

«I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go

yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the

treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue

to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet- for nominal it has

become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta-

but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not

delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention

was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than

to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many

points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states

have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are

at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move)

are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too

probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying

to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots,

whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that

of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and

not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically,

or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we

have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these

years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the

continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans,

our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the

rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

 

«And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while

the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous

to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men

who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would

leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied

before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they

are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite

bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous

to us than before. At present they might possibly come here as separate

states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would

scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow

ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their

own in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if

we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying

our power we went away again as soon as possible. We all know that

that which is farthest off, and the reputation of which can least

be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they

would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies

here against us. You have yourselves experienced this with regard

to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success,

as compared with what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise,

tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily. Instead,

however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries,

you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves

up to confidence, and to understand that the one thought awakened

in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may even now,

if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as

military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle,

therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans

in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the

oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.

 

«We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite

from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our

estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home

on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles

whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing

but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they

succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag

down their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed

at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition,

merely for ends of his own- specially if he be still too young to

command- who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account

of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment,

do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendour at his country’s

risk, but remember that such persons injure the public fortune while

they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance,

and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand.

 

«When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same

individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn,

summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next

him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a

coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success

is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the

mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened

by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the

other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing

between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for

the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy

their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans,

for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines

the war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that

for the future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used

to do, with people whom we must help in their need, and who can never

help us in ours.

 

«And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the commonwealth,

and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the question

to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the Athenians.

If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that a violation

of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many abettors, that

you will be the physician of your misguided city, and that the virtue

of men in office is briefly this, to do their country as much good

as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid.»

 

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward

spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been

voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest advocate

of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished

to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of

the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides,

exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily

and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means

of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led

him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both

in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later

on had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed

at the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of

the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook,

the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny,

and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war

was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence

to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and

thus before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came forward and

gave the following advice to the Athenians:

 

«Athenians, I have a better right to command than others- I must begin

with this as Nicias has attacked me- and at the same time I believe

myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring

fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides.

The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded

it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence

with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into

the lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private

person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took

care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom

regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without

leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that

I may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is

naturally envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners

has an air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless

folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only,

but his city: nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position

should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly

off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men courted

in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept the insolence

of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure to all,

and then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons

of this kind and all others that have attained to any distinction,

although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations

with their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to posterity

the desire of claiming connection with them even without any ground,

and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not as strangers

or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such are my aspirations,

and however I am abused for them in private, the question is whether

any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united the

most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense

to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon the

issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the

battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.

 

«Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments

to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win

their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now,

but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate,

avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither

rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you

would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled

by motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt

new ones in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without

any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons,

and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man

thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain

something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe

settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly.

From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel

or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as

they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife

as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry

as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous

as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their

numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout

this war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear,

will be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages,

for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred

of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers

at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with

these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind

us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to

win the empire, depending solely on their superiority at sea. The

Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at present;

and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade

our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their

navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.

 

«In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for

holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily

for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound

to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us.

We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas,

but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them

from coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has

been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant

readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite

assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose

whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and

should imperil those we have already won. Men do not rest content

with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first

blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact

point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in

which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend

it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled

ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view

as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make

them like theirs.

 

«Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this

adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the

pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting

them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying;

and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily

may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian

Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage

of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful,

or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be

superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And do not let

the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the

young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good

old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their

united counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you

endeavour still to advance them; understanding that neither youth

nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that levity,

sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that,

by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear

itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle

will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself

not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not

inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than

by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life

is to take one’s character and institutions for better and for worse,

and to live up to them as closely as one can.»

 

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans

and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their

oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager

for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be

now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but

thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance

of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

 

«I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition,

and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed

to give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear

we are going against cities that are great and not subject to one

another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced

servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept

our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns,

they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which

I expect to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are

seven others armed at all points just like our own power, particularly

Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are

full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance

and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands

of private persons, partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse

first-fruits from some of the barbarians as well. But their chief

advantage over us lies in the number of their horses, and in the fact

that they grow their corn at home instead of importing it.

 

«Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak

naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with

us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to

be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if

the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without

friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend

ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion,

or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at

first: we must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing

that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition

not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the quality of allies,

among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies

needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting

ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during

four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.

 

«I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy

infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from

our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money

in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to

make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming

superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what

we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is

to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled

to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of

our being weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it

is not every city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours.

We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can,

so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take

with us from home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of

as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any

other way.

 

«Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that

of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field,

but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult

to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves

that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he

who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master

of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find

everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall

have need of much good counsel and more good fortune- a hard matter

for mortal man to aspire to- I wish as far as may be to make myself

independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as

safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for

the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition.

If any one thinks differently I resign to him my command.»

 

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust

the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged

to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible.

The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage

taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more

eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias

had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that

the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in

love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either

subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events,

with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of

life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no

doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the

common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and

make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the

future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it

not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against

it, and so kept quiet.

 

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and

told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say

at once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him.

Upon this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon

that matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as

he could see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred

galleys- the Athenians providing as many transports as they might

determine, and sending for others from the allies- not less than five

thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible

more; and the rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home

and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable,

being got ready by the generals and taken with them.

 

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should

have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the

expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests

of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being sent

to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had

just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young

men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce,

everything was the more easily provided.

 

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city

of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common

in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most

of them their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large

public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further

voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been

committed should come and give information without fear of consequences,

whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up

the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition,

and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset

the democracy.

 

Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body

servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations

of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and

of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private

houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold

of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way

of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who

thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs.

These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that

the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were

part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing

of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being

the general and undemocratic licence of his life and habits.

 

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also

before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now

complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether

he was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished

if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile

he protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence,

and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty,

and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so

large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies

feared that he would have the army for him if he were tried immediately,

and that the people might relent in favour of the man whom they already

caressed as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining

in the expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected,

putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to

sail and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his

return within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him

sent for and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which

they would the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was

decreed that he should sail.

 

After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about

midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller

craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders

to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in a body

to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such

of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus

upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting

out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may

say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of

the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends,

their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their

way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or

of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long

voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at

this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one

another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for

the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse

provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that

could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of

the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing

all belief.

 

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly

and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single

city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that

against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against

Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four

thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred

galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies

besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty

equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a

long term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with

ships and troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet

had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the

state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing

empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty transports, and manning these

with the best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in

addition to the pay from the treasury to the thranitae and crews generally,

besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments, and one

and all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel

in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked

from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great

attention to their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted

not only a rivalry among themselves in their different departments,

but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display

of power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any

one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private

outlay of individuals- that is to say, the sums which the state had

already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands

of the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their

personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still

to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey

money which each was likely to have provided himself with, independently

of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and what

the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of exchange-

it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken

out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not less famous for

its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than

for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against

whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage

from home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in its objects

considering the resources of those who undertook it.

 

The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which

they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers

customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship

by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls

of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by

the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their

prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others

that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, they

put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other as far

as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the

allied forces were also assembling.

 

Chapter XIX

 

Seventeenth Year of the War – Parties at Syracuse – Story of Harmodius

and Aristogiton – Disgrace of Alcibiades

 

Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the expedition,

but for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly

was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by different

orators, believing or contradicting the report of the Athenian expedition;

among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came forward, being persuaded

that he knew the truth of the matter, and gave the following counsel:

 

«Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been

when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know

that those who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy

of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for their

pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue

when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak

with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you

wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with

a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans

and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all

our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow.

Make up your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see

how you can best repel them with the means under your hand, and do

be taken off your guard through despising the news, or neglect the

common weal through disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who believe me

need not be dismayed at the force or daring of the enemy. They will

not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness

of their armament altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the

greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots,

whom dismay will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive

them away, disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do

not fear for a moment that they will get what they want), it will

be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my judgment by no means

an unlikely one. Few indeed have been the large armaments, either

Hellenic or barbarian, that have gone far from home and been successful.

They cannot be more numerous than the people of the country and their

neighbours, all of whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry

for want of supplies in a foreign land, to those against whom their

plans were laid none the less they leave renown, although they may

themselves have been the main cause of their own discomfort. Thus

these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure

due to accidental causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been

the object of his attack; and this may very well be the case with

us also.

 

«Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send

and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance

of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that

the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our

allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also

think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are

by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear

that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps

think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed,

and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not

in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any

of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which

war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon

and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible,

and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing of all others,

in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your

constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must

nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as

many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of

our actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians

at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before

fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across

the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them

on thinking that we have a base for our defensive- for Tarentum is

ready to receive us- while they have a wide sea to cross with all

their armament, which could with difficulty keep its order through

so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack as it came on

slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if they were to

lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailers and with

these attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were wearied

with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to

Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give

battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either

have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast,

abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged

by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them.

In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to deter

them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and

reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season

go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected

a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their

most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against

his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious

demonstration of ours. We should also be reported, I am certain, as

more numerous than we really are, and men’s minds are affected by

what they hear, and besides the first to attack, or to show that they

mean to defend themselves against an attack, inspire greater fear

because men see that they are ready for the emergency. This would

just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are now attacking

us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge

us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing

them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which they

are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than

they could ever be by our actual power. I could wish to persuade you

to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not

a moment in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you

that contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action,

but that for the present the best course is to accept the preparations

which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to

act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming to attack

us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but here- this is what

I am sure of.»

 

Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were

at great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians

had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said;

some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not

be repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole

affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that

believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,

the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the masses,

came forward and spoke as follows:

 

«For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided

as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become

our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while

as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm,

I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter

themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that they

have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city

into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by

the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth;

they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are

always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well

advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities

by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large

experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do.

Now it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind

them, and before they have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come

in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment,

they are only too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so

many and so great cities as we are.

 

«However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better

able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all

points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match

for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again.

I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here,

except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force

of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will

already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly

laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required

against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity.

In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well

see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another

city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from

our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile

to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from

the ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which

they would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.

 

«But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to

know are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here

invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this

the first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to

deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to

frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is

what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often

they may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the

smart, may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the

offenders are known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely

at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent

against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies

and infamous cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me,

to let nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many,

and by chastising the authors of such machinations, not merely when

they are caught in the act- a difficult feat to accomplish- but also

for what they have the wish though not the power to do; as it is necessary

to punish an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand

for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would

not be also the first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and

on occasion warn the few- the most effectual way, in my opinion, of

turning them from their evil courses. And after all, as I have often

asked, what would you have, young men? Would you hold office at once?

The law forbids it, a law enacted rather because you are not competent

than to disgrace you when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on

a legal equality with the many! But how can it be right that citizens

of the same state should be held unworthy of the same privileges?

«It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable,

but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule.

I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people, includes

the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians

of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none

can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these talents,

severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy.

But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not

content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit;

and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in

a great city cannot possibly obtain.

 

«But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that

I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or

most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them-

even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still learn

wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common interest

of us all. Reflect that in the country’s prosperity the men of merit

in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the great

mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you have other designs

you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from reports like

these, as the people know your object and will not put up with it.

If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy

of itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to this matter.

And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to believe, the city

will not be thrown into a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon

itself a self-chosen servitude by choosing you for its rulers; the

city itself will look into the matter, and will judge your words as

if they were acts, and, instead of allowing itself to be deprived

of its liberty by listening to you, will strive to preserve that liberty,

by taking care to have always at hand the means of making itself respected.»

 

Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood

up and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words

of his own with reference to the matter in hand: «It is not well for

speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their hearers

to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that

we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as

a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no

need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and

arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to

and order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and

do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to

already, and whatever we discover shall be laid before you.» After

these words from the general, the Syracusans departed from the assembly.

 

In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived

at Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament,

and made arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor

and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted

one to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together and being

thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the stations

which they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better

ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own commander.

Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which

of the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on

the way and let them know before they put in to land.

 

After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross

to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and thirty-four

galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which one hundred

were Athenian vessels- sixty men-of-war, and forty troopships- and

the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five thousand and one

hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian

citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped

as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects,

and besides these five hundred Argives, and two hundred and fifty

Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty archers in all,

eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one

hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport

carrying thirty horses.

 

Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the

war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden

laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and carpenters,

and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by one hundred

boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides many other

boats and ships of burden which followed the armament voluntarily

for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck across

the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at the Iapygian

promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, coasted along

the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates against

them, and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor,

and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium,

the extreme point of Italy. Here at length they reunited, and not

gaining admission within the walls pitched a camp outside the city

in the precinct of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them,

and drew their ships on shore and kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened

negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon them as Chalcidians

to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that

they would not side with either party, but should await the decision

of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians

now began to consider what would be the best action to take in the

affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come

back from Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there

the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.

 

In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well

as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings

that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity

and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of preparation.

Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round to the Sicels,

garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country, horses

and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and

all other steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them

at any moment.

 

Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to

the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being

the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents.

The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed

at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the

Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had had

most reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines

and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the

news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise.

The Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the

first envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took

the envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed

them the treasures deposited there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and

a large number of other pieces of plate, which from being in silver

gave an impression of wealth quite out of proportion to their really

small value. They also privately entertained the ships’ crews, and

collected all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in

Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic

towns, and each brought them to the banquets as their own; and as

all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of

plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors,

and made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got

back to Athens. The dupes in question- who had in their turn persuaded

the rest- when the news got abroad that there was not the money supposed

at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers.

 

Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion

of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object

of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the

whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require

them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked

for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines

either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other

cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their

zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they

should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the

Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not

to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.

 

Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not

disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds

must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts

be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and

to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops;

and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage

and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and

base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing

who would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack

Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta

and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.

 

Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight

to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the

town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its

height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time

to run on without showing itself, men’s courage revived, and they

saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly,

while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the

best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a

complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers- which

would never appear so considerable as at present- by the anticipation

of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement.

They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside,

incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was

carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat

down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus

be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans,

and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which were the

strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to

retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited

place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

 

After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support

to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his

own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with

no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not receive

him within their walls, though they would provide him with a market

outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his

return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole

fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament

behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the Naxians,

they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the

inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to

the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in

single file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they

sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see if there was

any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from shipboard that

the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to their country,

as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore,

as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends

and benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and

reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the features of the country

which they would have to make their base of operations in the war,

they sailed back to Catana.

 

An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the

armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired;

and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on

the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern gate

without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into

the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the

army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at

all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians

and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After

this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with

all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately

upon their arrival.

 

Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there

the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were

manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with

all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning,

and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought to at

the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, refused

to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the

Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for

more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and

after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some

stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the

Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.

 

There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with

orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state

brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with

him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of

the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition,

had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the

mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers,

in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and

imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring

to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person

of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the

informer. The commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus

and his sons had become before it ended, and further that that had

been put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the

Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.

 

Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken

in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length,

to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of

the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts

of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession

of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not

Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower

of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank

of life, was his lover and possessed him. Solicited without success

by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and

the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might take

Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his condition

in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus,

after a second solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better

success, unwilling to use violence, arranged to insult him in some

covert way. Indeed, generally their government was not grievous to

the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; and these tyrants

cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without exacting

from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, splendidly

adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices

for the temples. For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment

of its existing laws, except that care was always taken to have the

offices in the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them

that held the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of

the tyrant Hippias, and named after his grandfather, who dedicated

during his term of office the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place,

and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people afterwards

built on to and lengthened the altar in the market-place, and obliterated

the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen,

though in faded letters, and is to the following effect:

 

Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,

Sent up this record of his archonship

In precinct of Apollo Pythias.

 

That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is

what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact

accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following

circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that appears

to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed in

the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which

mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias,

which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides;

and naturally the eldest would have married first. Again, his name

comes first on the pillar after that of his father; and this too is

quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant.

Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny

so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and

he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon the same day; but he

had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe the citizens, and to

be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered

with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger

brother unused to the exercise of authority. It was the sad fate which

made Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with posterity

of having been tyrant.

 

To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his solicitations

insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a sister of his,

a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, and

then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never been invited at

all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was indignant at this,

Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than ever; and

having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the

enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea,

the sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession

could meet together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius

were to begin, but were to be supported immediately by their accomplices

against the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better

security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot would

be carried away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use the

arms in their hands to recover their liberty.

 

At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside

the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of the

procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already

their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one of their

accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy of access

to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were discovered

and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to be revenged

first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they had undertaken

all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates, and meeting

with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once,

infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote

him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through

the crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no

merciful way: Harmodius was killed on the spot.

 

When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once

proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the

procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of

the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not

to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair

thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he

had something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove

the arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty

and all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons

for a procession.

 

In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire,

and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action recounted. After

this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now

grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and at the

same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of revolution.

Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a

Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that

they had great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus

with this inscription:

 

Archedice lies buried in this earth,

Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth;

Unto her bosom pride was never known,

Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne. Hippias, after reigning

three years longer over the Athenians, was deposed in the fourth by

the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a

safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from thence

to King Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in

his old age, and came with the Medes to Marathon.

 

With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew

by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of humour

and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the mysteries,

and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of an oligarchical

and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation thus produced,

many persons of consideration had been already thrown into prison,

and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily

more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those

in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a

fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter

on which there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then

or since, to say for certain who did the deed. However this may be,

the other found arguments to persuade him, that even if he had not

done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity,

and free the state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer

of safety if he confessed after promise of impunity than if he denied

and were brought to trial. He accordingly made a revelation, affecting

himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people,

glad at last, as they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious until

then at not being able to discover those who had conspired against

the commons, at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he

had not denounced, and bringing the accused to trial executed as many

as were apprehended, and condemned to death such as had fled and set

a price upon their heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether

the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest

of the city received immediate and manifest relief.

 

To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being

worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went

out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth

of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that

the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had

been contrived by him in the same intention and was connected with

the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just

at the time of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had

advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the

Boeotians. It was now thought that this had come by appointment, at

his instigation, and not on account of the Boeotians, and that, if

the citizens had not acted on the information received, and forestalled

them by arresting the prisoners, the city would have been betrayed.

The citizens went so far as to sleep one night armed in the temple

of Theseus within the walls. The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos

were just at this time suspected of a design to attack the commons;

and the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given up by

the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death upon that account:

in short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against

Alcibiades. It was therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute

him, and the Salaminia was sent to Sicily for him and the others named

in the information, with instructions to order him to come and answer

the charges against him, but not to arrest him, because they wished

to avoid causing any agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily,

and above all to retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives,

who, it was thought, had been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades,

with his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed off with

the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went

with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared,

being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing against

them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for Alcibiades

and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found,

set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat

not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed

sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company.

 

Chapter XX

 

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War – Inaction of the Athenian

Army – Alcibiades at Sparta – Investment of Syracuse

 

The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into

two parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for

Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give

the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain

the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along Sicily,

with the shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf

they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the

island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage. On their

way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war

with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town

to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which

the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels until it reached

Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves on

board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast

and went to Egesta and, after transacting his other business and receiving

thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold their slaves for

the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round to their

Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile went with

half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the territory

of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it.

 

Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began

to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side

for marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians failed

to attack them instantly as they at first feared and expected, every

day that passed did something to revive their courage; and when they

saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicily, and

going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought

less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude

is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana,

since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan

horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian

armament, and among other insults asked them whether they had not

really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather

than to resettle the Leontines in their own.

 

Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in

mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime

to sail by night alongshore, and take up at their leisure a convenient

position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to

disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for them,

or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a

force which they were themselves without) would then be able to do

the greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed

them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which

the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan

exiles with the army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum,

which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals

imagined the following stratagem. They sent to Syracuse a man devoted

to them, and by the Syracusan generals thought to be no less in their

interest; he was a native of Catana, and said he came from persons

in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals were acquainted

with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party still

left in the city. He told them that the Athenians passed the night

in the town, at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans

would name a day and come with all their people at daybreak to attack

the armament, they, their friends, would close the gates upon the

troops in the city, and set fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans

would easily take the camp by an attack upon the stockade. In this

they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already prepared

to act, and from whom he himself came.

 

The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who

had intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man

without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they

would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others

of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans

to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed

for their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed

the night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. Meanwhile

the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all

their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them,

put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse.

Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum

ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having

ridden up first to Catana and found that all the armament had put

to sea, turned back and told the infantry, and then all turned back

together, and went to the relief of the city.

 

In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one,

the Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient position,

where they could begin an engagement when they pleased, and where

the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of annoying them,

either before or during the action, being fenced off on one side by

walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs.

They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the

sea, and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones

which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the

most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down the bridge

over the Anapus. These preparations were allowed to go on without

any interruption from the city, the first hostile force to appear

being the Syracusan cavalry, followed afterwards by all the foot together.

At first they came close up to the Athenian army, and then, finding

that they did not offer to engage, crossed the Helorine road and encamped

for the night.

 

The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their

dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied by the

Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest

of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight

deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed

also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to

the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were

placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their

heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of their

own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent

being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans,

numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers

from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve

hundred strong, and next to it the darters. As the Athenians were

about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, and addressed

these words of encouragement to the army and the nations composing

it:

 

«Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves,

who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being,

to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech

with a weak army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and

the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange

indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not

feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass levies opposed

to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain

us but will not stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate

to their rashness. You may also remember that we are far from home

and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall

win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that

which the enemy are appealing to; their cry being that they shall

fight for their country, mine that we shall fight for a country that

is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly get away, as we shall

have their horse upon us in great numbers. Remember, therefore, your

renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait

and necessity more terrible than they.»

 

After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans

were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some

had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran

up as hard as they could and, though behind time, took their places

here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of

zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either

in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage,

so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed

them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the

present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians

would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their

defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced

to meet them. First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of

either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another,

as might be expected between light troops; next, soothsayers brought

forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry

to the charge; and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for

their country, and each individual for his safety that day and liberty

hereafter; in the enemy’s army, the Athenians to make another’s country

theirs and to save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives

and independent allies to help them in getting what they came for,

and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left

behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the

desire of self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious;

next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on

easier terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.

 

The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought

without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps

of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add

to the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little

acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these

phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more

alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the

Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians

routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus

cut in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue

far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan

horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom

they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors

followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set

up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road,

where they re-formed as well as they could under the circumstances,

and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing

that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there.

The rest returned to the town.

 

The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected their

dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field.

The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the

number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and

gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians and

allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.

It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to

carry on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent

for from Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily- to do away

with their utter inferiority in cavalry- and money should have been

collected in the country and received from Athens, and until some

of the cities, which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen

to them after the battle, should have been brought over, and corn

and all other necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against

Syracuse.

 

With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter.

Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an assembly,

in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability

of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant

courage in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them

not to let what had occurred make them give way, since their spirit

had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the

mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have

been expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices in

the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the most practised

soldiers in Hellas. What had also done great mischief was the number

of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders

given, combined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops.

But if they were to have a few skilful generals, and used this winter

in preparing their heavy infantry, finding arms for such as had not

got any, so as to make them as numerous as possible, and forcing them

to attend to their training generally, they would have every chance

of beating their adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline

in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities

would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while

their courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which

skill inspires. The generals should be few and elected with full powers,

and an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their

command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better

kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be

no room for excuses.

 

The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and

elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus,

and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also sent envoys to Corinth and

Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them, and to induce

the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address themselves in

real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they might either

have to leave Sicily or be less able to send reinforcements to their

army there.

 

The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina,

in the expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however,

after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when

he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he

would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of

the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors,

and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of their

way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of the

Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they

were exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met with no

success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships

to lie in, erected a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter

quarters; meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry

to join them in the spring. During the winter the Syracusans built

a wall on to the city, so as to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites,

all along the side looking towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation

longer and more difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also

erected a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades

along the sea wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they

knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with

all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the

tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning

also that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the

strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain,

if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose

them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent

what they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now

feared that they would refuse to assist them at all in future, after

seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join

the latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates, with

some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus

and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans

having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of

prejudicing them against the Athenians:

 

«Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid

of your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but

rather of your being gained by what they would say to you before you

heard anything from us. They are come to Sicily with the pretext that

you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion less

to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from ours;

as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the

cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine

Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the

Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony. No; but the

same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is now being

tried in Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians

and of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the

Athenians accused some of failure in military service, some of fighting

against each other, and others, as the case might be, upon any colourable

pretext that could be found, until they thus subdued them all. In

fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight

for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty,

but the former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him,

the latter to change one master for another, wiser indeed than the

first, but wiser for evil.

 

«But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them

the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian,

but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess

in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through not

supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried

upon ourselves- such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support

of Egestaean allies- do not stand together and resolutely show them

that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change

continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes

some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling

in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city

after another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered,

and seeing that they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us

by words, to draw some by the bait of an alliance into open war with

each other, and to ruin others by such flattery as different circumstances

may render acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction first overtakes

a distant fellow countryman that the danger will not come to each

of us also, or that he who suffers before us will suffer in himself

alone?

 

«As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he,

that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have

to encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in

mind that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for

his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the

struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but

with me as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so

much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind

to secure the friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies

or even fears us (and envied and feared great powers must always be),

and who on this account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us

a lesson, but would still have her survive, in the interest of his

own security the wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A

man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control circumstances;

and in the event of his calculations proving mistaken, he may live

to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity.

An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share

of perils which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him

as for us; what is nominally the preservation of our power being really

his own salvation. It was to be expected that you, of all people in

the world, Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and the next

in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead of supporting us

in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would rather come to us

of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which

you would have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians

had first come, to encourage us to resist the invader. Neither you,

however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves in this direction.

 

«Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the

invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians.

But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against

the enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians when

they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging their

neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse

to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange

if, while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are wise

without reason, you, with every reason on your side, should yet choose

to assist your natural enemies, and should join with their direst

foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk. This

is not to do right; but you should help us without fear of their armament,

which has no terrors if we hold together, but only if we let them

succeed in their endeavours to separate us; since even after attacking

us by ourselves and being victorious in battle, they had to go off

without effecting their purpose.

 

«United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new encouragement

to league together; especially as succour will come to us from the

Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted superiors of the

Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent policy of taking

sides with neither, because allies of both, is either safe for you

or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be.

If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your

refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave

the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend unhindered?

And yet it were more honourable to join those who are not only the

injured party, but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend the

common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from

doing wrong.

 

«In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to demonstrate

either to you or to the rest what you know already as well as we do;

but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced

by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you our fellow

Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their victory to

your decision, but in their own name will reap the honour, and will

receive as the prize of their triumph the very men who enabled them

to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will

have to pay for having been the cause of our danger. Consider, therefore;

and now make your choice between the security which present servitude

offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping disgraceful

submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting enmity of

Syracuse.»

 

Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian

ambassador, spoke as follows:

 

«Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack

of the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good

right we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished,

when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the

fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers

and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping

their domination. After the Median War we had a fleet, and so got

rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no

right to give orders to us more than we to them, except that of being

the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the King’s

former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least

likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have

a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done

nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders,

the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk,

came against their mother country, that is to say against us, together

with the Mede, and, instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice

their property as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves

themselves, and to try to make us so.

 

«We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet

and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and

because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience

to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against

the Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of having a right to

rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because

we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question

any more than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled

with for providing for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily,

it is equally in the interest of our security, with which we perceive

that your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct

which the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously

suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried

away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come

to act follow their interests.

 

«Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and

fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely

matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any

from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting

ourselves in you without your having anything to do with us, seeing

that, if you are preserved and able to make head against the Syracusans,

they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to the Peloponnesians.

In this way you have everything to do with us, and on this account

it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines, and to

make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful

as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from their frontier.

In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the assertion

that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian, while

we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful to

us by being without arms and contributing money only; while the former,

the Leontines and our other friends, cannot be too independent.

 

«Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable

if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity

is everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily,

our interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their strength

to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies

as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves

and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute

in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take,

are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round

Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should

therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we

say, of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object

to use the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when

we have gone away without effecting anything, by force or through

your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily. And masters they

must become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude

would be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would

be more than a match for you as soon as we were away.

 

«Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first

asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens

if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is not right

now to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince

us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with a larger

force against the power of that city. Those whom you should really

distrust are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without

you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection,

we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of

the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military

sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you,

not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have with us,

plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once offered,

as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, and now

have the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid them

against the power that hinders this, and that has thus far maintained

Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite you to a much more

real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common safety which

we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even without

allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to you, while

you will not often have the opportunity of defending yourselves with

such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your suspicions, you once let

these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you will wish to see if only

a handful of them back again, when the day is past in which their

presence could do anything for you.

 

«But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will

not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have

told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and

will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We assert

that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators

in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are

compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many things

to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies to

those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation

but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges

or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now

difficult to do, so far as there is anything in our interfering policy

or in our character that chimes in with your interest, this take and

make use of; and be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike,

to most of the Hellenes that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to

it, all men in all places, even where we are not, who either apprehend

or meditate aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the

one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in the other,

of our arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained,

respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved

without trouble of their own. Do not you reject this security that

is open to all who desire it, and is now offered to you; but do like

others, and instead of being always on the defensive against the Syracusans,

unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten them.»

 

Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this.

Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be

afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity

with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however, that they

were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of the two,

and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them, both

sent them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for

the future determined to support them most in fact, although as sparingly

as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the

Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the engagement,

to answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered that

as both the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they

thought it most consistent with their oaths at present to side with

neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either party departed.

 

In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war,

the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to

gain as many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in the low lands,

and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the

interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few exceptions,

at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the army, and

in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against those who

refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of

others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements.

Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to

Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed

there the rest of the winter. They also sent a galley to Carthage,

with proffers of friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance,

and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having spontaneously

offered to join them in the war. They also sent round to the Sicels

and to Egesta, desiring them to send them as many horses as possible,

and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and all other things necessary

for the work of circumvallation, intending by the spring to begin

hostilities.

 

In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon

tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the Italiots to interfere

with the proceedings of the Athenians, which threatened Italy quite

as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at Corinth made a speech calling

on the Corinthians to assist them on the ground of their common origin.

The Corinthians voted at once to aid them heart and soul themselves,

and then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade

her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians more openly at home

and to send succours to Sicily. The envoys from Corinth having reached

Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades with his fellow refugees, who had

at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene

in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians’

own invitation, after first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared

them for the part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result

was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all

the same request in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded

in persuading them; but as the ephors and the authorities, although

resolved to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their surrendering

to the Athenians, showed no disposition to send them any assistance,

Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians

by speaking as follows:

 

«I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am

regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to

listen to me upon public matters. The connection, with you as your

proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of some discontent

renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices towards

you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. But

although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate

the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen

them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to complain if

I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions

of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come when those

among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have been then

unfairly angry with me, should look at the matter in its true light,

and take a different view. Those again who judged me unfavourably,

because I leaned rather to the side of the commons, must not think

that their dislike is any better founded. We have always been hostile

to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called commons;

hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which,

as democracy was the government of the city, it was necessary in most

things to conform to established conditions. However, we endeavoured

to be more moderate than the licentious temper of the times; and while

there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude

astray- the same who banished me- our party was that of the whole

people, our creed being to do our part in preserving the form of government

under which the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and

which we had found existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among

us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more

cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a

patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under

the pressure of your hostility.

 

«So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can

call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which

superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily

first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots

also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage. In the

event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to

attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes

lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians

into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries,

confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys

in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful

in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea

and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities

by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped

without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule

the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn meanwhile for the better

execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities

by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently of

our revenues here at home.

 

«You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the

man who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining

generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same. But that

the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will

now show. Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might

even now be saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone,

beaten already in one battle with all their people and blockaded from

the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian armament that is

now there. But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy

immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from

that quarter will before long be upon you. None need therefore fancy

that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless

you speedily do as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse

troops that shall able to row their ships themselves, and serve as

heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I consider even

more important than the troops, a Spartan as commanding officer to

discipline the forces already on foot and to compel recusants to serve.

The friends that you have already will thus become more confident,

and the waverers will be encouraged to join you. Meanwhile you must

carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans, seeing that

you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that

the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament. You must

fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always

most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced

in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to

find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of attacking

him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and

fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits

you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall

pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property

there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture

or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their

revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains

from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue

from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose

their awe of Athens and see you addressing yourselves with vigour

to the war. The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends,

Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite

confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken.

 

«Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me

if, after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively

join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say

as the fruit of an outlaw’s enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity

of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from

your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your foes,

but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and love of country

is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when secure

in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am now

attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to recover

one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not

he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he

who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it.

For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without

scruple for danger and trouble of every kind, and to remember the

argument in every one’s mouth, that if I did you great harm as an

enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend, inasmuch

as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours.

For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests

are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send without hesitation

the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the presence of a small part

of your forces you will save important cities in that island, and

you will destroy the power of Athens both present and prospective;

after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy over

all Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and affection.»

 

Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves

before intended to march against Athens, but were still waiting and

looking about them, at once became much more in earnest when they

received this particular information from Alcibiades, and considered

that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth of the

matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying

of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and naming

Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans, bade

him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange

for succours reaching the island, in the best and speediest way possible

under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send

him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they

intended to send, and to have them ready to sail at the proper time.

Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.

 

In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the

generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what

they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and the cavalry.

And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year of the

present war of which Thucydides is the historian.

 

The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians

in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in

Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled

the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying

the territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the country,

and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans, went

on with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland

laid waste the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing some

of a small Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up

a trophy, went back again to their ships. They now sailed to Catana

and took in provisions there, and going with their whole force against

Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and

departed, after also burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans.

Upon their return to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens,

to the number of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but

without their horses which were to be procured upon the spot), and

thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.

 

The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went

as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to

return. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on

their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was

sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long

after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office,

which was not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some

were caught, while others took refuge at Athens.

 

The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been

joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against

them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous

spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could not, even

if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined to guard

its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved

by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as the remainder

is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be

seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called

by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly went out

in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus, their

new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come into

office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they

first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of

Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready

to muster at a moment’s notice to help wherever help should be required.

 

Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review,

having already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana,

opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile from

Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to

anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow

isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land or water.

While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the

isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went

on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before

the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and

the review. Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as

quickly as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from

the meadow before reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable

disorder, the Syracusans were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired

to the town, with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus

among the number. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored

to the Syracusans their dead under truce, and next day descended to

Syracuse itself; and no one coming out to meet them, reascended and

built a fort at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae,

looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and

money, whenever they advanced to battle or to work at the lines.

 

Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta,

and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus,

with the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got

horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they

bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all. After

posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they

sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation.

The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced,

determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it;

and the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan

generals observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting

into line, and were in such disorder, that they led them back into

the town, except part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered

the Athenians from carrying stones or dispersing to any great distance,

until a tribe of the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry,

charged and routed the Syracusan horse with some loss; after which

they set up a trophy for the cavalry action.

 

The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of

the Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they

kept laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their

works from the great harbour to the sea; while the Syracusans, guided

by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of risking

any more general engagements, determined to build a counterwork in

the direction in which the Athenians were going to carry their wall.

If this could be completed in time, the enemy’s lines would be cut;

and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack,

they would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure

the approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians

would have to leave off working with their whole force in order to

attend to them. They accordingly sallied forth and began to build,

starting from their city, running a cross wall below the Athenian

Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting wooden towers. As the

Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the great harbour, the

Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and the Athenians brought

their provisions by land from Thapsus.

 

The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their counterwall

sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of being divided

and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall,

did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to guard the

new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed

their pipes of drinking-water carried underground into the city; and

watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday,

and some even gone away into the city, and those in the stockade keeping

but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked men of their

own, and some men picked from the light troops and armed for the purpose,

to run suddenly as fast as they could to the counterwork, while the

rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one with one of the

generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other with the other

general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked

and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge

in the outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers

burst in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by the Syracusans,

and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after which the whole

army retired, and having demolished the counterwork and pulled up

the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own lines, and set

up a trophy.

 

The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the

cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards

the great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work

to go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile

the Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from

the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside

to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to

the sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff

they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering

the fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse,

they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying

doors and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest, crossed

over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except

a small portion which they captured afterwards. A battle now ensued,

in which the Athenians were victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans

flying to the town and the left to the river. The three hundred picked

Athenians, wishing to cut off their passage, pressed on at a run to

the bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them most of

their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back upon the

Athenian right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a panic

by the shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian

left with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch,

was left alone with a few that had crossed with him, and was killed

with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans managed immediately

to snatch up in haste and get across the river into a place of security,

themselves retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up.

 

Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing

the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed

against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their

number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while denuded

of its defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork of

a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who happened

to have been left in it through illness, and who now ordered the servants

to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down before the wall;

want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of escape

impossible. This step was justified by the result, the Syracusans

not coming any further on account of the fire, but retreating. Meanwhile

succours were coming up from the Athenians below, who had put to flight

the troops opposed to them; and the fleet also, according to orders,

was sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour. Seeing this, the

troops on the heights retired in haste, and the whole army of the

Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking that with their present force

they would no longer be able to hinder the wall reaching the sea.

 

After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans

their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who

had fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and military,

being now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed

the Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea. Provisions were

now brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and many

of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things went,

came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of

fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably

for their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety

in arms, no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were

now proposing terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias,

who after the death of Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision

was come to, but, as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged

more straitly than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and

still more in the town. Their present misfortunes had also made them

suspicious of one another; and the blame of their disasters was thrown

upon the ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose command

they had happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides,

Eucles, and Tellias, elected in their stead.

 

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth

were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief

of Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind,

and all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely

invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save

Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian,

Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians

to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian

and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an embassy

to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of citizenship which his father

had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor

and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean Gulf he was caught

by the wind which blows violently and steadily from the north in that

quarter, and was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough

weather, remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and refitted such

of his ships as had suffered most from the tempest. Nicias heard of

his approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the scanty number of

his ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of the

voyage, and so took no precautions for the present.

 

About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos

with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians

went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking

their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up

to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast of the rest

of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of

their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the

Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with

their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with

them, and depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however,

under the command of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed

at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the

country; and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext

for hostilities against Athens. After the Athenians had retired from

Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, the Argives made

an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home after ravaging their

land and killing some of the inhabitants.

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